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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
\"S.

RICillRD JESSUP,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT
Defendant, hereinafter called the appellant, h;
seeking to reverse the trial court on two general
'Propositions of law: First, (App. Br. p. 2) that
the trial court .erred in overruling defendant's motion to quash the information, and Second, (App.
Br. p. 11) that the trial court erred in overruling
appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
The information charges the appellant in the
language of the statute (Sec. 1103-51-2, Laws of
Utah, 1935, page 220), that he, on or about the 1st
day of September, 1939, at Washington County,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State of Utah, "did cohabit with more than one
·person of the opposite sex.''

ASSIGmfENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1, 4, 5, AND
10
Appellant's motion to quash i·s argued upon
the grounds that: (A) the information fails to
state a public offense; (B) that the criminal act
under which it is drawn is (1) unconstitutional,
(a) because it provides for more than one subjeet
(b) because the title does not cover its subjects,
(c) because it combines a criminal and civil statute,
(d) because it is inconsistent with other acts, and
(e) because it provides that a wife must testify
against her husband; and (2) the said section fail's
to set forth or describe a crime; (C) that the information fails to comply with the section stating
the crim~.
1

(A)
It ·seems as though appellant has exerted himself to list a volume of possible objections rather
than to cite tenable objections and objections of
:merit. His argument is that the charging part of
thP information (which is also the words of the
statute), to-wit: "did cohabit with more than one
person'' are merely ''words of wind'' and can
mean to dwell with one's brothers, sisters, or even
children; that said charging part ·should have adjectives such as "lewdly and laciviously cohabit"
in order to give criminal import to said chargingpart.
In order to follow appellant's argument, the
le.oislative act would have to be distorted to 'include
th~ crime of bigamy. One of the e'ssential elements
of bigamy is that of sexual intercourse. Said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
element ''is not a necessary ingredient in the crime
'Of unlawful cohabitation.''
State v. Springer, 40 Ut. 471; 121 Pac. 976.
United States Y. Cannon, 4 Utah 122;
~lifirmed 116 U. S. 55, and
United States v. Mus'8er, 4 Utah 153.
The Cannon and Musser cases are based on the
''Edmunds .Act. •' which is designed to protect
monogamous marriages. (See U. S. v. Cannon, 4
Ut. 141). The charging part of the Edmunds Act
is 'Similar to the Act under which appellant is
charged, to wit : ''If any male person . . . hereafter cohabits with more than one woman, he shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Mr. Justice
Zane, through
L"nited States v.
156: ·says:

~Iusser,

4 Utah, at page

"We are of the opinion that the weight of
authority is to the effect that the crime of
unlawful cohabitation, as defined in the
statute under consideration, is made without proof of sexual intercourse, and that
proof of non-intercourse is not a defense.
. . . We mav assume that the authors of
this law had~ mind the institution of marriage, because they expres·sly declared that
any man who having a wife, marries another, is guilty of a crime, and that any
male person who cohabits with more than
one woman is guilty of unlawful cohabitation. They had in view the evil effects of such
practices. The end of the law was the protection of the monogamous ·marriage, and the
suppression of polygamy and unlawful cohabitation was but a means to that end. It
is proper also to take into consideration
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the conditions as the national legislature
anticipated and underl:itood them in which
the law was to be applied and enforced.
They knew the time had elapsed within
which a very large portion of those living
in polygamy could be punished for 1that
offense, and that many of these were
among the rnost influential men in ·society,
being the heads of the church, and that
the example of their continuing to live
with their plural wives under a claim of
divine right, would be a scandal to society
and tt menace to the lawful marriage; that
such examples would be a continuing invitation and apparent justification for
their followers either ·secretly or openiy to
violate the law. Congress, therefore, forbade plural marriage in appearance only,
as well as in form, and by the example of
punishment it doubtless intended to eradicate the example of apparent plural marriages a·s well as the plural marriage in
form . . . . "
The information is based on the new Code of
Criminal Proeedure, which prescribes a short form
of information and further pre-scribes that an information is good if drawn in terms of the statute
defining the offense and is sufficient to give the
court and defendant notice of what offense is intended to be charged. (Section 105-21-9, Laws of
Utah, 1935). The information being drawn in the
words of the statute meets the statutory requirement of validity.
Appellant's complaint that the wording of the
information was not sufficiently explanatory could
have been well supplied by a Bill of Particulars.
This was not requested by the appellant; neither
did the court request the State to give the appel-
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lant a Bill of P<u·ticulars. The appellant is not in
a IJO~ition to complain of the information not being specific and sufficiently e~-planatory when ho
sits idly by and doe-::; not avail himself of his statutory right to be particuhuly apprised of the crime
of which he is charged.
One person may think that an information
charging him in plain, short, and understandable
language .. that he cohabited wi.th more than one
person of the opposite o.sex, '' informs him better of
the offense than an information drawn with great
detail after the order of an old common law pleading. \\bile the con'\"'"erse may be tn1e with another
accu::::ed per~on, the merits of the long and short
form of indictments or informations are discussed

in
State v. RDy (1936), 40 N. M.; 60 Pac.
{2d) 646; 110 A.L.R. 1.
B-1 (a)
(1) .Appellant's
next
through his motion tD qu~.sh,
under which the information
·stitutional; because it contains
ject. Said act comprises

ground,
advanced
is that the statute
is drawn is unconmore than one sub-

Chapter 112, Laws of Utah, 1935.

It reads as follows :
"If any person cohabits with more than
one person of the opposite sex, such person is guilty of a felony.
''Any person, except the defendant, may
be compelled to testify in a prosecution for
unlawful cohabitation; provided, however,
that the evidence given in such proseeution shall not be used agairrst him in any
proceeding, civil •or criminal, except for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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perjury in giving such testimony. A person so testifying shall not thereafter be
liable to indictment, prosecution, or puni'shInent for the offense concerning~ which such
testimony was given.''
It will be noted that the Act deals with the
penal code and concerns onlv sexual offense-s. Al-.
most every Act of the Leg1~lature can b_e divided
so that it will contain two or more subjects from
a :-;trict grammatical point of view. 'rhat is to
say, if an Act contains two sentences, it contains
two subjects. It would be utterly ridiculous to say
that the framers of the Constitution intended,
through Article VI, Section 23, to prohibit all
legislative Acts containing more than one sentence.
Appellant's cited case of State v. Green, 68 Utah
251; 249 Pac. 1016, treats this point quite exhaustively. The opinion in the Utah report, at page ·277,
quoting another opinion, says:
'':Manifestly th~ purpose of this provision
of the Constitution is to prevent the Legislature from intermingling in one act two
or more separate and distinct propositions
- things which, in a legal sense, have no
connection with, or proper relation to,
each other. The reasons for, and the
scope of, constitutional provisions of this
character, are well illustrated in 26 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d) 575, in the following1
language:
'' 'This requirement of singleness is not
int~nded to embarrass honest legislation,
hut only to prevent the vicious practice of
joining, in one act, incongruous and unrelated matters; and, if all the parts of a
statute have a natural connection and
reasonably relate>, directly or indirectly to
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one general and legitimate subject of legislation, the act is not open to the objection
of plurality, no matter how exte.nsively or
minutely it deals with the details looking
to the accomplishment of the main legisla th·e purpose'. ''
Said Green opinion at page 281 reeites that on
tweh·e different cases litigants have raised the
question of statutes being unconstitutional because they contained more than one subject and
only one has been successfully contested.
The Green case seems to be quite in point with
the instant case. In the Green case, the horseracing
act was contested as being unconstitutional because
it contained n1ore than one subject, towit: that of
horseracing and that of betting or wagering by way
of the pari-mutuel system. The Green case held
that the act did not contain more than one subject
within the purview of the framers of the Constitution.
The subjects in the instant case do not appear
to be as distinct and separate as do the subjects in
the Green case. Cohabitation; compelling a person
to testify, u8ing evidence in civil or criminal proceedings, and liability to prosecution for giving
testimony, all relate to- the criminal code and to
sex offenses. Hence, we believe that within the
contemplation of the framers of the constitutional
provision (Article VI, Section 23), Chapter 112,
Laws of Utah, 1935, does not contain two subjects.
Even if said Chapter 112 was unconstitutional, this-,
appellant could not avail himself of its unconstitutionalitv because his case dealt only ·with one subject- that of unlawful cohabitatio~. His wife wa~
not compelled to testify a}~ainst him; neither was
his purported plural wife; hence no occasion arose
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for such evidence to be used against him in civil
or criminal cases, and therefore, no liability could
arise out of the giving of such evidence.
Suppose the Legislature, to avoid any assailing of its Act upon appellant's contention, divided
said Section 103-51-2, Laws of Utah, 1935, into four
distinct and separate bills- {1) on unlawful cohabitation; (2) on compelling a witness to testify;
un on using evidence in civil or criminal proceedings; and (4) on exempting one who testifies, from
liability. Each bill would have to be interlocking
and references tied to each other in order to give
the full meaning of the intent of the Legislature.
All cow;;titutional or legislative Acts are supposeq
to be based on reason and public policy. Would. it
be more reasonable tq draft the ·contents of said
Section 103-51-2 in four separate bills ·than to draft
it in one? Could said section be more clearly, ex.pressed through interlocking phraseology of ~our
bills necessary to give the contents of said sectio11;?
What public policy would favor express.~:p.g; 1 ~~~<J
Section 103-51-2 in four bills? Th~se que~tions
clearly answer themselves.
1

~

B-1 (b)

.)

Appellant next: complairis of Ch1apter ]_i'2';'L~~s
of Utah, 1935, being unconstitutional because, ·its.
title does not express all)ts sp_bj~cts ., .·He qubtes
59 C. J. 812 and State Fair f. G;r~en, ,6~ Utah 251~
as saying ''all parts of an f\Ct whi~ch, ·are. not. within
the title are unconstitutiqn.:~J and vo~d. n ' Said Cornus Juris cib.tion more flillv stated, reads as fol.
.
.
lows (Page~ 811~8~4): .: , ·
~

I

I

Sec. 393: ''Since a constitutional r~quirement that the subject .of a statute be ex-
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pressed in its title is generally regarded as
mandatory, the title is an essential p~u·t of
an act, and the- subject express.ed in the
title fixes tl1e limit of the valid scope of the
act. The pro\isions of an act must correspond with the subject expressed in its
title; so nothing can validly be included
in the body of a statute which is not expressed in or covered by the title, and all
parts of an act which are not within its
title are unconstitutional and void, even
though such provisions might properly
ha\e been included in the act under a
broader title.
All matters, hO\vever,
which are germane to, and naturally connected with, the subject anno-unced by the
title of an act and not excluded thereby
are covered by it and may validly be included in the statute; and for the purpose
of determining whether or not a provision
is germane to the title a reasonable meaning should be given to the words and context of the provision.
Sec. 394: ''Any means or provisions reasonably adapted to carry,.. out and make
effectual the principal object or purpose
of a statute as disclosed by its title may
be included in the body of the act, although
not expressed or referred to in the title,
without violating a constitutional provision requiring the subject of an act to be
expre~sed in its title.''
It will be noted that appellant has failed to
descend this above quoted gPneral principle of law
down to the particulars of the instant case, as is
announced in Section 394, supra, and also as iB
held "t.y the above Green case. In the Green case,
the horseracing statute was assailed as being unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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constitutional, because, among other reasons, parts
of the act were not within the title, henee, such
parts were void. The title of said horseracing act
read: ''An Act Relating to Hors.eracing and Providing for the Creation of a State Racing Commission and Defining its Powers and Duties and Re,pealing all Acts .and Parts. of Acts in Conflict
Therewith.'' Section 6 of the act permits betting
after the order of the pari-mutuel system. Appellant contended in said Green case th.at :said Section 6 was not expressed in the title of the act.
The Court held to the contrary on the theory that
the pari-mutuel system of betting is associated and
connected with horseracing. A note at page 814 of
the above quoted Corpus Juris citation quotes the
rule announced by Mr. Justice Straup in State Fair
v. Green, supra, to be as follows:
''A provision in a bill to be germane to the
subject expressed in the title is not required to be a necessary or ev-en a usual
or customary incident to the subject so expressed in the title. It is. enough if it is
directly or indirectly related to, and bears
a natural connection with, sucb general
subject, and such connection or relationship need not even be logical, but must be
harmonious, and not discordant, with the
expressed subject.''
An examination of the above authorities readily shows that the body of Section 103-51-2, supra.
is germane, rPlated to and couchPd under the title
of said section. To follow appellant's motion in
the instant case? the title of the act would be about
~as large as the body of it and would express its suhstance about as much as it would be expressed in
the body of the act. It seems clear that the constitutional convention did not intend the legislative
bodies
toFunding
go into
great
length
andof particularSponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
provided
by the Institute
Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ity in the title of acts so that every pa.rticular part
of the act is e~-pressed in its title. :rhe act in question
we be~ien:>, would haYe been sufficiently expressed
in its title if said title would have onlv referred to
unlawful cohabitation; because comp~lling all but
'the defendant to testify and exempting them from
criminal and civil liability is directly related to the
act concerning unlawful cohabitation.
B-1 (c)

Appellant next complains because the act combines a criminal and a civil statute. He cites the
case of State v. Truman, 32 Wash. 294; 73 Pac. 375.
In the Truman case the act was entitled "An Act
Relating to Crimes and Punishments, and Proceedings in Criminal Cases.'' The act then provided for bastardy proceedings. Held that bastardy
proceedings were civil, hence, in derogation of the
constitutional provision providing that every law
shall oontain but one subj.ect, which shall be ex·
pressed in its title.
In the instant case the act only gives the witness who testifies a privilege to the effect that
what she says cannot be used against her in any
criminal or civil action except for perjury. Said
act has nothing to do with combining a civil action
with a criminal action or providing for a civil action under title of a criminal action as is announced
in the Truman case. Then, too, the appellant cannot claim any prejudice to his substantial rights
because his wife did not testify against him.
B-1 (d)

Appellant next complains about the unlawful
cohabitation act, Chapter 112, as being inconsistent
with Chapter 118, Section 105-21-39, Laws of Utah,
1935, in that the former act exempts the wife and
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the plural wife from prosecution aR a~cessories,
while the latter section includes them as accessories. We need not bother ourselves with a construction or explanation of the mentioned inconsistency,
as it does not concern us because the wife or plural
wife did not testify in the instant case.
B-1 (e)
Appellant next complains that the act, Section
103-51-2, supra, violates Article I of Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution, which provides that" a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband.'' This question is not at issue, because appel·
lant 's wife did not testify against him, hence, he
i~ not an interested party to complain against the
unconstitutionality of the act.
B-1 (d)
Appellant lists as another reason that the said
act violates Article I of Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, that it disregards the provision that
the ''accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against l1imself. '' He raises this question out
of a twisted reasoning that the complaint should
have listed his purported wives as accomplices and
then in this premise the statute provides that the
purported wife is compelled to testify against herself. Appellant, through his contortions of reasoning, has apparently, by inadvertance, built thr
premise of a confession that his purported wives
should have been listed along with him as accom·plices. -.-We submit also that this point is immater
.ial and not before the Court for con~ideration, for
the reasons expressed in the preceding subdivision
B-1
(e).Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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c.
Appellant complains of the information failing
to comply with Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935.
He parallels the info1·mation with a hypothetical
information charging a public offense as: "John
Doe committed murder,'' and further says that
~uch eharge is meaningless, that it is like hanging
a man beeause he is charged with committing murder when no one has been killed. He then cites
'"Porms for Certain Offenses," as is prescribed by
Section 105-21-47, Laws of Utah, 1935, one of whiclt
is: '' AB murdered CD.''
Appellant's hypothetical information would
'he more parallel if the instant information alleged:
''Richard Jessup committed unlawful. co.habitation." The information follows the stock statutory rule of pleading (Section 105-21-8, Laws of
J.Ttah, 1935), which provides it is sufficient if it
charges the offense by using the name given it by
'Statut~ by stating so much of the definition of the
offense in terms of the statute defining it. As
heretofore stated, the information follows specifically the wording of the statute defining unlawful
cohabitation. It seems appellant's complaint is
that the information does not give the names· of
the persons of the opposite sex with whom appellant is alleged to have cohabited. Of course,
through a Bill of Particulars, which he did not request, the names could have easily been supplied.
Hence, appellant is in a .poor position to now complain of the failure to supply the names. (State
v. Roy, supra). Suppose that ,the court would not
allow the names of the women he is alleged to have
cohabited with (probably for reasons of public
'Policy, such as to preserve the character and reputation of the women) to be announced. Query:
Would the information and proof be essential to
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warrant a conviction without an allegation and
'proof of the names of the persons of the opposite
sex~ Could it he said that the crime of unlawful
cohabitation was not committed when the charge
and proof clearly showed that John Doe ".did co-:
habit with more than one person of the opposite
sex,'' without alleging and proving the names of
the persons of the opposite sex~ No matter how
;overwhelming is the proof of the crimL. should
justice be defeated because the prosecution does not
or cannot supply the names of the women the
accused is alleged to have cohabited with? ''What's
"in a name - a rose by any other name would smell
as sweet.'' So, too, the crime of unlawful cohabitation would be as complete by showing the persons
'that appellant is alleged to have cohabited with
were of the opposite sex. Yes, "opposite sex"
more accurately defines them than to list their
names, for their names might suggest they were of
the 'male sex. The opposite of ap:pe1larrt 's cont•.}ntion is the contention of the appellant in United
States v. Cannon, 4 Ut. 134, that is to say, the indictment charged that Angus M. Cannon committed
·the crime of unlawful cohabitation, etc. The information was contested because it did not allege
he was a male person. The Court held:
''An indictment for the offense created by
Section 3 of the Act of Congress . . . (very
similar to Section 103-51-2, supra) need not
state that the defendant is a male person,
even if the defendant's name be not a distinctively masculine name. It is presumed
that the defendant is charged as a male
person, when he is charged with an
offpnse 'vhich eon1d only be conunitted b~r
such a person.''
Appellant cites the above Cannon case as an
for Funding
holding
thatprovided
the byfailure
toMuseum
recite
thPServices
Sponsored by the authority
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
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names of the women the accused is alleged to have
cohabited with as being "insufficient in not giving
particulars.'' Said holding is not contra to the
instant case, because it was appellant's fault in not
asking for a Bill of Particulars enlarging the information to include the nan1es of the members
''of the opposite sex.''
As authority for our contention that the information is sufficient, we cite State v. Roy, supra
(40 N. M. 397; 60 P. (2d) 646; 110 A.L.R. 1).
Said Roy case is quite recent (1936) and many of
the jurisdictions uphold the short form of the indictment. It is too Yoluminous to attempt to set
out herein. We believe it is a well selected case.
We invite the Court to read it.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 2, 3.
Appellant next complains of the insufficiency
of the evidence to warrant the case going to the
jury. His complaint is centered on the failure of
the State's evidence to show that the persons of
the opposite sex had a fixed residence with the
appellant.
The State's first witness called (Tr. p. ,2) was
Lola Jessup. She was not present. A doctor's
certificate was produced showing she was physically unable to be at court (See Judgment Roll).
The testimony of the State's witness, Deputy
Sheriff Sam Fullerton, as pertinent reads as follows (Tr. p. 3):

"Q. On September 1st, as deputy sheriff,
and with Antone B. Prince, county sheriff;
you made a visit to New Harmony, is that
right?
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A.

Yes.

Q. At that time did you visit the home
of Richard Jessup up near New Harmony~
A. Yes.
Q. State just what you saw when you
went in there, that is with reference to individuals or persons.
A. Well, when I went in there was one
lady setting right to the right of
the door, as I went in, and another
lady back a little further, and she left. I
never only just saw her as she went out the
hack door.
Q. Do you know who went out the back
door1
A. Yes.
Q. Who was it you saw at the place as
you first went in~
A. Ida Jessup, she told me her name was.

Q. The wife of Richard
A. Yes.

Jessup~

Q. Did she tell you who went out the back
door1
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. She said it was Lola.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Do you know where Lola
No.

went~

Did you see Lola again that dayf
No.

Q. Have you seen Lola since that time?
A.
No.
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Q. When she went out the back door did
she run or did sne just walk out t
A. .,Veil, she went pretty fast.''

The testimony of Sheriff Antone B. Prince,
as pertinent, is as follows (Tr. p. 4):
'' Q. Did you visit the Richard Jessup
home that day! (Sept. 1).
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see Lola Jessup at that
time!
A. No.

Q. Did you know where she was!
A. I didn't know where she was.
couldn't locate her.

We

Q. How is that!
I don't know where she was.

A.
Q.
A.

You didn't see her at the home?
No.

Q. Did you have any conversation with
Richard Jessup with reference to Lola?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he say anything about where she
was!
A. He said that he didn't know where
she had gone.

Q. Did you see Lola Jessup after that
day!
A. Yes.
Q. When?
A. The following morning.
Q.

Where did you see her then 1
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A.

In her horne.

Q.
A.

Where~

In the home of Richard Jessup.

Q. That is near New
A. Yes.

Harmony~

What was the purpose of your visit
there at that time~
A. I went to serve a subpoena on both
she and Ida Jessup.

Q.

Did you serve a subpoena upon Lola
Jessup or Johnson~
A. Yes.

Q.

What name did you serve the subpoena in~
A. I think it was Lola Jessup Johnson.

Q.

Q. Lola Jessup Johnson~
A. If I remember correctly. I could be
mistaken.- I served Jessup, I know, I
wouldn't say ~bout Johnson. I believe it
was Johnson.
Q. Did you ask her at that time if she
'vas Lola Jessup, or do you remember~
A. I don't remember making - asking
that question.

Q. You did see Lola Jessup, or Lola
Johnson, at that time~
A. Yes.
Q. ·vVhere was she 1
A. She was in the living room behind a
door, sitting on a bed holding a baby 1n
her arms.
Q.

She was not in bed at that time?
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A. No.
Q. Was she at that time apparently in
good health, as nearly as you could tell t
A. As near as I could tell, yes.

Q. "\Vill you state whether or not, if you
observed, that she was in a pregnant con.dition T
A. Yes, sir."
Miss Mary Carling testified tl1at she lived at
New Harmony about two weeks prior to September
1st; that she is a cousin to Lola Johnson Jessup
and to Ida Johnson Jessup; that she has known
Lola Jessup ever since she was a little girl; that
she was staying with her cousin, Lydia, wife of
Fred Jessup, which was 30 or 40 yards from the
Richard Jessup home; that she saw Lola Johnson
at the Richard Jessup home about September 1st,
and that she was on a visit at that time; that Lola
Johnson was pregnant.
The record shows that the witness, Mary Carling, was a very unwilling witness and attempted to
shield her cousins and appellant on facts surrounding the commission of the crime.
The foregoing facts and testimony, appellant
conte-;·ds, do not establish unlawful cohabitation
within the meaning of the authorities he has cited,
in that said facts do not establish a "fixed residence'' of the ''persons of the opposite sex.''
If said facts were all the facts of this case bear· ing on the sufficiency of the evidence, we are of. the
opinion that the issue would be close as to whether
or not the State made a prima facie case. We· will not
stop to show the above facts made a prima facie' case·.
because we believe said facts, coupled with the
confession of the appellant free and voluntarily
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given on his own ini)~iative as he was being taken
to jail, clearly and convincingly establishes the
State's case. The record, as pertinent, (Tr. p. 23),
reads:

"Q. Now, will you state where that conversation took place, or that statement was
made, rather?
A. vV ell, it was in my car on the road
from New Harmony.

Q. Who was in the car at that time~
A. Richard Jessup and Fred Jessup, myself and Mr. Fullerton.
Q. vVill you state what that was that Mr.
Jessup said at that time~
A. :Mr. Jessup said that they were being
persecuted, he didn't say "prosecuted,"
persecuted, for the same thing that their
fathers had done.

Q. And did he say anything further at
that time that you recall?
A. He said: 'We believe in living the
laws of God~' as near as I can recall, he
savs: 'The laws of man are man-made
la~s,' he says : 'We believe in living
according to the laws of God.'

Q. Then what did you do after you
arrived at St. George~
A. ·we put them in the county jail and
went home."
Such a confession, coupled with the facts,
warrants the jury in bringing in their verdict of
:~uilty after only five minutes of deliberation.
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ASSIGNMENT NO. 6
.Appellant objects to the State asking n witness
if she was acquainted with Lola J olmson, sometimes called Lola Jessup,'' on the grounds that no
one had testified that Lola Johnson was also known
as Lola Jessup. The record ( Tr. p. 5) shows that
the sheriff testified to serving a subpoena on Lola
Jessup Johwon. Hence, even if appellant's objection was serious, it is cured by the record's
prior showing Lola Johnson and Lola Jessup was
one and the same person.
4 4

ASSIGXMENTS 7 AND 9
Appellant next objects to the court permitting
testimony of the whereabouts of persons two days
aiter the arrest of the appellant. We fail to find
such testimony in the record. We do find testimony concerning the whereabouts of Lola and Ida
the next day after the arrest. (Tr. p. 28).
We believe because of the close proximity to
the time of the alleged crime, no error could arise
that would reach to the substantial right of the
appellant, especially in view of the appellant's
confession.

ASSIGNMENT NO. 8
Appellant further complains of the State's
testimony showing the pregnant condition of Lola
Johnson. He cites U. S. v. Cannon, 4 Ut. 122, as
an authority. Said Cannon case holds that it is
not essential to prove sexual intercourse in order
'for the State to prove a prima facie case.
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14 C.J.S., at page 1311, says:
''As defined in the dictionaries and cases
the meaning of the word in its broad sense
is to dwell or live with or together in the
same place, house, or abode. More specifically, however, "cohabit" has been defined as meaning to live together as husband and wife, or man and wife, lawfully
or ~nlawfully as the case may be, as implying sexual intercourse, or the possibility of sexual access.''
Although sexual intercourse is not an essential element to be proved in the crime of unlawful
cohabitation, pregnancy of one of the opposite sex
directly relates to the proof of dwelling together
as man and wife. Especially is this true when the
proof is that both of the persons of the opposite
sex were pregnant (Tr. p. 25). ·We believe that
the question of pregnancy of Lola Johnson is very
material and pertipent to the proof of unlawful cohabitation of the appellant. Even if the fact of
pregnancy was not material, an overruling of objection to the introduction of such evidence would
not be error going to prejudice the substantial
rights of the appellant.
We submit that appellant had a fair trial and
no error was committed by the trial court infringing upon the substantial rights of this appellant.
Re·spectfully submitted,
JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General,
ZELPH S. CALDER,
...L\ssistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Respondent.
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